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in
statements he made during a police interrogation because they were
impermissibly-coerced statements. The State's responds by contending Mr. Simpson
misrepresented the relevant facts and law.

However, when the proper standard of

review is given effect, and Mr. Simpson's argument and the relevant precedent are
properly understood, the State's attacks are revealed to be mistaken.

As such, this

Court should disregard those arguments.
On the merits of this claim, the relevant facts and legal precedent reveal that the
district court erred in denying Mr. Simpson's motion to suppress the coerced-compliant
statements elicited by the police interrogation. Therefore, this Court should reverse that

this case

judgment of conviction,

statement of the facts

course of proceedings were previously articulated

in Mr. Simpson's Appellant's Brief.
are

further proceedings.

not

herein by reference thereto.

1

this Reply Brief, but

2

cases,

is important to

of

resolving the claims therein. When dealing with claims such as the one Mr. Simpson
on

the Court reviews

legal conclusion - whether the statements

were coerced, as opposed to voluntary - de novo. State v. Aitken, 121 Idaho 783, 784
(Ct.

1992); cf Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) ("the ultimate issue

of 'voluntariness' is a legal question") (internal quotation omitted). Under this standard,
"[t]he

must show

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's

statements were voluntary." State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 912 (Ct App. 2013).
Applying that standard of review in this case, the video and transcript of the
show the officers
try

him

1a

make.

interrogation tactics against
was not

1b.) Whenthe

ofthe

willing
isevaluated,it

clear that those tactics were not properly employed against Mr. Simpson, and
so, resulted in eliciting unconstitutional coerced-compliant statements.
Br.,

12-35.)

Thus,

(See App.

on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances,

Simpson contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
coerced-complaint statements

from

him

(App.

Br., pp.12-35.)

Rather than discuss the officers' tactics within the totality of the circumstances,
the State takes a tangential approach in its Respondent's Brief, trying to discredit

3

The District Court's Order Denying His Motion To Suppress
that Mr.

Court's

- that

concerns with police coercion in custodial interrogations are equally applicable in the
interview" (App. Br., p.13) - misrepresents the precedent on this issue.
(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)

As the State's argument indicates, custodial interrogations are

different than noncustodial interviews in
scenario.

of the amount of coercion that exists in

In that regard, Mr. Simpson recognizes his use of the term "equally,"

standing alone, might have been unclear.
appreciate that statement within the context

However, the State's argument fails to
Mr. Simpson's full argument:

concerns about improperly

are

a

a

in

was

that,

ial

voluntarily.

(App. Br., pp.13-14.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has

a totality of the circumstances test to

whether the defendant's

were voluntary or whether his will was

State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 400

overborne in noncustodial interviews with

(1997); State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 (1993).

In adopting that test, the Idaho

Supreme Court recognized that, because coercion can occur in a noncustodial
interview, coercion should be a factor in the courts' assessment of the totality of the
circumstances. Id. In fact, the Troy Court expressiy identified it as the first of several

4

,a

a

1

were
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 21

(1993)
Thus,

while the

2 1, 214

226 (1973)).

and

highlights the distinction between

noncustodial interrogations, it misses the critical point resulting from this distinction:
Miranda warnings are required in custodial interrogations because of the increased
coerciveness of that situation. However, that does not mean that situations where such
warnings are not required cannot occur still be impermissibly coercive.

See, e.g.,

v. Fernandez-Torres, 337 P.3d 691, 703 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (finding statements
have been impermissibly coerced during a noncustodial interrogation despite a
finding that Miranda warnings had been given and the underlying right to remain silent
United States v.

751

3d 1008, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding
interrogation to

during a
impermissibly coerced).
Troy Court's determination that

is one

factor in the totality

of the circumstances is consistent with the United State Supreme Court's discussion on
the same topic:
We recognize, of course, that noncustodial interrogation might possibly in
some situations, by virtue of some special circumstances,
characterized as one where "the behavior of ... law enforcement officials
was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about
confession not freely self-determined .... " When such a claim is raised, it
is the duty of an appellate court, including this Court, "to examine the
entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue
of voluntariness." Proof that some kind of warnings were given or that
none were given wouid be reievant evidence oniy on the issue of whether
the questioning was in fact coercive.

5

u

1
911

2 (recognizing both Beckwith and Troy identify coercion as a relevant
and explaining that, in such

the

show the defendant's statements were, in fact, voluntary).
concerns with

in

Thus, the
in

do, as Mr. Simpson's entire

noncustodial scenario as well as the custodial scenario.
State's own citation to Oregon v. Elstad

In
Simpson's

concern

noncustodial setting

its

- that

police coercion exiting in the

be squared" with Supreme Court precedent (Resp.

- is erroneous:

by

'"Indeed, far from being
if not

Constitution,

some

are inherently

even
damning admissions."'

u

305 (1

as even

v. Elstad, 470

Br., p.6 (quoting

(internal

omitted)

cited by the State demonstrate, a proper consideration when

addressing an admission by the defendant is whether that admission was coerced.
Thus, because

can occur in either

or

Beckwith, Troy, Loosli, and other such decisions, recognize that, whether Miranda

warnings were given, regardiess of whether they were required, remains a relevant
factor to consider when evaluating whether the defendant's' statements were voluntary.
Since

Simpson's claim is consistent

States

6

Court and idaho

in

on

is

merits of Mr. Simpson's claim of
gave adequate consideration to
(Resp. Br., p.10.)

the

contends that the

fact that no Miranda warnings were given.

However, that assertion ignores the plain language of the district

court's statement. The district court explained, "[w]hile this Court understands that [the
absence

such warnings] could be a negative factor, Miranda did not apply because

this was not a custodial interrogation."

(R., p.116 (emphasis added).)

By only

acknowledging it "could be" a negative factor, the district court expressed its
understanding that it might be a factor in a particular, but not every, case.

The

particular cases in which the district court believed that to be a relevant factor is
identified
a

district court's
. (R.,

statement: that factor "did
116.)

apply" in the absence
interpretation of

more

is that it did not believe that Miranda warnings were a factor in

d

case

there was not a custodial interrogation.

(See R., p.116.)

In that

case, it did not adequately consider the impact of a relevant factor within the totality of
the circumstances of Mr. Simpson's case.

Troy, 124 Idaho at 214 (expressly

identifying "whether Miranda warnings were given" as the first of many relevant factors
consider in this regard); Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400 (reaffirming that

Troy factors are

applicable in the noncustodial context).
Since the district court was operating on an erroneous interpretation of the
governing lega, standards, its resuiting iegal conciusion is erroneous. At any rate, the

7

is

novo.
no

in

reliance on the

State takes

v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999).

decision in

(See Resp.

, pp.10-12.) First, Idaho's own case law makes several similar points to those made
in Rettenberger when analyzing the potentially-coercive use of interrogation techinques

within the totatlity of circumstances of a particular case. Compare State v. Kysar, 114
Idaho 457, 459 (Ct. App. 1988) (involving a less extreme fact pattern which
nevertheless resulted in coerced statements because the questioning unconstitutionally
overbore the subject's will); with Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400 (involving a more extreme fact
pattern which nevertheless did not overbear the subject's will). As discussed in depth in
Appellant's Brief, this case is more like Kysar than Loosli. (App. Br., pp.17-18.) The
no

on

generally Resp. Br.)

Simpson

nor

it even

In addition

Kysar or Loosli.

demonstrating the State's allegation that

somehow misrepresented the relevant law is mistaken, the fact that

State ignored this relevant Idaho precedent reveals that the State has failed to meet
its burden to prove Mr. Simpson's statements

in fact, voluntary. See Valero, 153

Idaho at 911-12.
Second, while, as

State points out, there are some factual differences

between Rettenberger and this case (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12), rare would be the pair
of cases that are factually identical. As such, Idaho's courts have often examined how
other states have handied simiiar issues, particuiariy when examining an issue not fully

8

or a

in a

in

is

jurisdictions."); State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 703 (Ct. App. 2013) ("We find
reasoning fo

Massachusetts

of Appeals persuasive.").

Mr. Simpson has cited Rettenberger for those same purposes here. Despite the
factual differences, the Rettenberger Court's discussion of the nature of the various
interrogation techniques used in that case is still insightful, particularly its explanation of
how and why several of those interrogation tactics, which might be innocuously used in
some cases, are impermissilby

in others.

See, e.g., Fernandez-Torres, 337

3d at 703 (expressly relying on Rettenbergefs analysis in determining the trial court
had properly suppressed coerced-compliant statements resulting from a noncustodial
interrogation); cf Preston, 751

1

(mirroring the Rettenberger Court's
noncustodial

a

a suspect with a low
Rettenbergers

was impermissibly coercive).

discussion

is still useful

Therefore,

understanding and

analyzing the issue in this case.
Ultimately, though, applying the precedent from cases like Kysar, Loosli, and
Troy, the district court erred in denying

statements,

Simpson's motion to suppress his coerced-

this Court should reverse that decision.

9

were

on

to be "tracking" their questions. (Resp.

it is

to

, pp.9-10.) Here
reviews that

the governing standard of review: This

issue de nova, deferring only to those factual findings which are not clearly erroneous

(i.e.,

not

supported

by

competent

and

substantial

See,

e.g.,

Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (defining the clearly erroneous
standard); Aitken, 121 Idaho at 784 (rearticulating the standard of review for this claim).
The issue Mr. Simpson raised on appeal is that the district court's legal conclusion that, Mr. Simpson was not "impermissibly confuse[d], trick[edJ, or deceive[d]" into
making the statements in question (i.e., coerced into making the statements) (R., p.117)
- is erroneous when the totality of

is properly

. (App.

, pp.12-35.)
Properly understanding the
of
representation

of

reveals the

Simpson's argument within the
State's

on

Simpson's

Mr. Simpson did not contend, as the

district court

Dr. Lindsey's testimony.

"ignore" means "to

to take notice of."

( See Resp.

that the
, p.10.)

The term

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND

THESAURUS, 403 (2007). Mr. Simpson did not contend that the district court refused to
take notice of

. Lindsey's testimony. (See generaliy App.

Rather, Mr. Simpson

contended the district court's conclusions "misconstrued" that testimony.

(App.

, p.18.) The term "misconstrue" means "to interpret wrongly." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

10

means

518

AND

COLI

an erroneous
mean.
to the

within his
one of

court's conclusions, Mr. Simpson

factual findings necessarily inferred by that conclusion - that

Simpson's mental health issues did not compromise ability to make voluntary
decisions within the interrogation in this case - was not based on substantial and
competent evidence, and so, was clearly erroneous, because it was a non sequitur.
(App. Br., pp.18-19.) As such, Mr. Simpson is contending the district court improperly
an inference or conclusion (that Mr. Simpson's will was not overborne due to his
health issues) which does not logically follow from the premise (that he was
the questions).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

490 (3rd pocket ed. 2006)

term "non sequitur'').
information very
person," not
was incapable

understanding the

.1, p.90, Ls.10-12

(emphasis added).) As a result of this condition, Mr. Simpson was aware of, and thus,
the question, but his ability to process the whole context of the questions, and
so, make voluntary decisions to speak, in

situation was compromised.
almost illogical" explanations.

particular, high-pressure, fast-evolving

This resulted in him giving topical, yet "simplistic and
(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.11-24.)

Thus, the district court's

In this context, the term "track" means being "aware[] of a fact or progression."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 842 (2007).

1

11

his

underlying

is borne out by the

court's

Lindsey's testimony,

inference

challenge to

as

not constitute a

misrepresentation of the facts.
More important, though, is the impact this more-complete understanding of
Simpson's mental health

issues has on the legal conclusion of whether

Mr. Simpson's statements were voluntary. The State does not address Mr. Simpson's
to the district court's legal conclusion in this regard. (See generally Resp. Br.)

If

Simpson's mental health issues were, as Dr. Lindsey testified, in play during the

interrogation, that factor indicates the situation was more coercive in the totality of the
v. Brown, 1
V.

u

1

Idaho 423, 430 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting

1

1

986)) (reaffirming

condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to
is a

needs

be

Court
questioning

a person's
"'

in

totality of the circumstances).

of voluntariness

coercion in response to the

novo, that factor can and should incorporated into its evaluation of

that question.
To that

it is important

proving the statements were voluntary.

remember that

State bears

burden of

See, e.g., Valero, 153 Idaho at 911-12. The

offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Lindsey's testimony about the nature
and presentation of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues generally or in this speclfic

12

were
Finally on this point, the State contends that Mr. Simpson has improperly argued
this

to "apply the law to the conclusions of his experts" rather than to the

conclusions drawn by the district court.

(Resp. Br., p.12.) Again, the State fails to

appreciate the governing standard of review. Since this Court reviews the conclusion of
voluntariness de nova, Mr. Simpson has argued that this Court should, in evaluating
the totality of the circumstances, include the insights of the two professionals who
offered their expert opinions about the coercive nature of the interrogation and the role
Mr. Simpson's mental health issues played in that context.

"When such a claim

[regarding admissibility of allegedly-coerced statements] is raised, it is the duty of an
court, including

United States Supreme] Court, 'to examine the entire

an
425 U.S.

of the

(quoting

384 U.

of

"'2

741

, see also

As the United States Supreme Court has indicated it is the duty of the appellate courts
to "examine the entire record' to make its de nova determination of voluntariness as it
relates to potential violations of the Fifth Amendment, Beckwith 425 U.S. at 347
(emphasis added), this Court can consider
information in the 2013 PSE and the
PSI, as they are both part of the entire appellate record. (See R., pp.160-61 (Clerk's
Certification of Exhibits).) Thus, it should reject the State's assertion that it should
refuse to consider those documents. (See Resp. Br., p.12 n.1.)
At any rate, the relevant point of the information in those documents (namely,
Mr. Simpson's inability to adequately process the information being presented by the
officers, and thus, make voluntary statements in response) was sufficiently presented in
Dr. Lindsey's testimony to the district court. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.85, L.9 - p.92, L.17.)
Therefore, this Court should still consider that factor in its de novo review of the legal
conclusion that Mr. Simpson's statements were not coerced.
2

13

is

(1

1

V.

circumstances, and
determination

Mr.

questioning

and extracted a coerced-compliant statement in violation of Mr. Simpson's constitutional
rights.

(See generally App. Br., pp.12-35.)

Since that information is relevant to the

totality of the circumstances, Mr. Simpson has properly
that information in its determination on that matter.
As the

has offered no meritorious challenge to

claims Mr. Simpson

actually made on this appeal, and since it has ultimately failed to carry its burden to
show that Mr. Simpson's statements were, in fact, voluntary in light of the totality of the
the district
is

decision to deny Mr.
to

motion to

erroneous.

should reverse

this Court
reverse the district

DATED this 21st day

denying his motion

judgment
suppress,

December, 2015.

Deputy State Appeiiate
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